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A constitutional investigation of the state of majoritarianismin in South African 
industrial relations. 
Phathutshedzo Godfrey Netshidongololwe 
 
CHAPTER 1 
1.1 Introduction 
Section 23(5) of the Constitution1 enshrines the right to engage in collective bargaining. With 
the exception of the labour dispensation prior to 1995, there is no legal duty to bargain. 
Somehow the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (hereinafter referred to as the LRA) purports 
to promote collective bargaining. Section 32 of the LRA provides for the extension of collective 
agreements concluded in a bargaining council to non-parties at the latter’s request. Where the 
parties to the bargaining council have as their members, and where their members employ the 
majority of employees in the industry, then the Minister of Labour (hereinafter referred to as 
the Minister) must extend a collective agreement, upon request, to non-parties.2 Where the 
majority threshold is not met section 32(5) states that the Minister may exercise his/her 
discretion. The Minister may extend a collective agreement to non-parties if satisfied that the 
parties to the bargaining council are sufficiently representative within the bargaining councils 
registered scope,3 and a failure to extend the collective agreement may undermine collective 
bargaining at a sectoral level or in the public service as a whole.4 
The constitutionality of section 32 and the decisions by the Minister to extend collective 
agreements has come under some criticism in recent years in South Africa.5 The aim of this 
study is to examine whether section 32 and 35 of the LRA promote the principles of 
majoritarianism and whether they pass the test of constitutionality. This study is based on a 
doctrinal analysis, with the aim of bringing consistency and coherence to section 32 of the LRA 
by analysing it and providing suggestions for law reform. 
                                                          
Masters student at the University of Johannesburg. 
1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
2 S 32(3)(b) and (c) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (hereafter the “LRA”). 
3 s 32(5)(a) of the LRA. 
4 s 32(5)(b) of the LRA. 
5 Free Market Foundation v Minister of Labour 2016 266 ZAGPHC 2.1. 
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To ensure that the reader has a clear understanding of what is in issue in this dissertation, it is 
best to first lay a foundation by giving a brief discussion of what the Constitution provides 
regarding collective bargaining thereafter, what labour law is and its purpose. Building on   this 
foundation, this study will provide an in-depth analysis of what collective bargaining is and 
why it is important. Once this foundation is built, the study will analyse the cruxes of the matter 
by looking at the principle of majoritarianism and bringing forth the constitutional challenges 
this principle faces. Moving forward this study will then analyse how collective agreements 
are extended, by looking at the existing regulatory framework, the purpose of extensions, and 
outline the challenges created by extensions. 
This study will then highlight why the principle of majoritarianism is unconstitutional, by 
listing and discussing all infringements created by this principle. The study will then touch 
upon agency shops and closed shops. Then look at recent case law dealing with 
majoritarianism, to see how South African courts are addressing majoritarianism. This study 
will further examine international law to see what obligations South Africa has in regards to 
collective bargaining and see how international law deals with majoritarianism and the 
extension of collective agreements. Lastly, this study will provide recommendations for reform 
before concluding. 
 
CHAPTER 2 
2.1 The Constitution 
The Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic of South Africa.6 Constitutional 
supremacy entails inter alia that the judiciary has the power to enforce the Constitution and 
may therefore declare any laws or conduct in conflict with the Constitution as invalid.7 The 
Constitution is the principle source of labour relations in South Africa with section 23 stating 
that: 
“(1) … everyone has the right to fair labour practices; 
(2) Every worker has the right to form or join a trade union; to participate in the activities 
and programmes of a trade union; and to strike; 
(3) Every employer has the right to form and join an employers’ organisation; and to 
participate in the activities and programmes of an employers’ organisation; 
                                                          
6 S 2 of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
7 Van Niekerk Law@Work (2015) 109. 
6 
 
(4) Every trade union and every employers’ organisation has the right to determine its own 
administration, programmes and activities; to organise; and to form and join a federation; 
(5) Every trade union, employers’ organisation and employer has the right to engage in 
collective bargaining.”8 
 
Now with the above in mind, one must establish what enabling legislation, if any, says 
regarding labour practices. 
 
2.2 What is Labour Law and its Purpose? 
Before dealing with the enabling legislation of section 23 of the constitution, a brief explanation 
of what labour law is and its purpose is necessary. In simple terms, labour law is defined as a 
body of rules that regulates the relationship between employer(s) and employees and trade 
unions. The law is a technique for the regulation of social power,9 meaning that labour law also 
functions to regulate, support and restrain the power of management and the power of organised 
labour. The main purpose of labour law is thus to be a countervailing force to the inequality of 
bargaining power.10 
 
2.3 The purpose of the LRA 
For one to understand the purpose of the LRA, cognisance must be given to its origin. Since 
the inception of the final Constitution of the Republic of South Africa in 1996, all law is subject 
to the provisions and principles of the constitution. Section 23(1) of the Constitution states that 
everyone has the right to fair labour practices.11 The LRA is the enabling legislation of section 
23 of the Constitution. 
The purpose of the Act, as explained in section 1, is “to advance economic development, social 
justice, labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace by fulfilling the primary objects 
of this Act which are– 
“(a) to give effect to and regulate the fundamental rights conferred by section 23 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
                                                          
8 S 23 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
9 Kahn-Freund Labour and the Law (1997) 48. 
10 Van Staden and Smit “The regulation of the employment relationship and the re-emergence of the contract of 
employment” 2010 TSAR 702705. 
11 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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(b) to give effect to obligations incurred by the Republic as a member state of the 
International Labour Organisation. Furthermore to promote collective bargaining by; 
‘(c) providing a framework within which employees and their trade unions, employers and 
employers' organisations can - 
(i) collectively bargain to determine wages, terms and conditions of employment and other 
matters of mutual interest; and 
(ii) formulate industrial policy; and 
(d) to promote - 
(i) orderly collective bargaining; 
(ii) collective bargaining at sectoral level.” 
Thus, the purpose of the LRA is to promote orderly collective bargaining whilst advancing 
economic development, social justice, labour peace and democratisation of the workplace. This 
is achieved through the regulation and giving effect to section 23 of the constitution. However, 
the LRA promotes collective bargaining at a sectoral level, but it does not enforce it nor does 
it impose a duty to bargain. 
Now that it has been established that the purpose of the LRA is to promote orderly collective 
bargaining, amongst other things, as discussed above, one must now gain a better 
understanding of what collective bargaining is. 
 
CHAPTER 3: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
 
3.1 What is collective bargaining? 
 
Collective bargaining is define as the process in which employers and organised groups of 
employees seek to reconcile their conflicting goals through a process of mutual 
accommodation.12 It is a process whereby there is a demand and a compromise, and its 
objectives is to reach an agreement. Collective bargaining assumes a willingness on each side 
not only to listen to the representations of the other but also to abandon fixed positions where 
possible, in order to find common ground.13 
 
                                                          
12 Grogan Workplace Law (2017) 315. 
13 Metal and Allied Workers Union v Hart Ltd 1985 6 ILJ 478 (IC) 493 H-I. 
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3.2 Mechanism for collective bargaining: Trade Unions 
The most common vessel that fights to protect workers and/or employees is a trade union.14 A 
trade union is an association of employees whose principal purpose is to regulate relations 
between employees and employers, including any employers’ organisations. Trade unions are 
voluntary associations. Trade unions consist of full-time officials, office-bearers and members. 
Union representatives represent members on the shop floor.  
The primary function of trade unions is to engage in collective bargaining with their members 
employers, and to represent members in grievances and disciplinary matters. Trade unions also 
appoint officials or members to bodies charged with ensuring employer compliance with 
legislation, health and safety regulations and collective agreements.15 
 
3.3 Methods of collective bargaining. 
There are two types of collective bargaining procedures, which can be distinguished, namely: 
“the institutional or dynamic procedure” and “the contractual or static method.” The contractual 
method means that the intention of the parties, that is, the employer or employers association 
and the unions come together in order to negotiate with the aim of reaching an agreement. Once 
an agreement is reached, they can still renew their negotiations if there is a need.16 
On the other hand, the institutional method relies on the creation of a permanent bilateral body, 
known as a joint industrial council, here both sides are represented by an equal number of 
members. The parties to this body then create a constitution and code of procedure, however 
the body is then tasked with the duty of settling the wages and other substantive conditions of 
the industry.17 There are various levels upon which employers and employees can bargain such 
as plant level, also known as workplace or company level bargaining, and sectoral level also 
known as industry level bargaining and/or at centralised level. The LRA promotes collective 
bargaining at sectoral level neglecting other levels such as plant level, leaving questions as to 
whether the LRA is really doing all that it can to promote collective bargaining.  
                                                          
14 Municipal & Allied Trade Union of SA and Saldanha Bay Municipality & others2018 39 ILJ 1164 (CCMA) 
1177 74. 
15 Grogan Collective Labour Law (2014) 37-38. 
16 Sarah Christie “Majoritarianism, collective bargaining and discrimination” 1994 15 ILJ 708 712. 
17 Kahn-Freund Labour and the Law (1997) 53. 
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3.4 Importance of collective bargaining. 
There is a huge difference in bargaining power between an employer and employees, thus these 
inequalities can result in workers/employees having little to no choice but to accept terms and 
conditions of employment that are not in their favour, resulting in labour exploitation. 
According to Davies and Freedland, the inequality in an employment relationship is evident 
and reference is made to Kahn Freund’s  much heralded phrase: 
 
“the relationship between an employer and an isolated employee or worker is typically a 
relation between a bearer of power and one who is not a bearer of power. In its inception 
it is an act of submission, in its operation it is a condition of subordination, however much 
the submission and the subordination may be concealed by that indispensable figment of 
the legal mind known as the contract of employment.”18 
 
Thus, the most efficient and effective manner in which employees can improve their bargaining 
position is by coming together with other employees to increase their collective power. Kahn 
Freund states that often legal norms are not effective unless they are supported by the 
countervailing power of trade unions and that of organised workers,19 highlighting the 
importance of collective bargaining, and the vulnerability of workers who do not have the 
power to bargain. He believes that the law should support and protect collective bargaining but 
maintain a hands-off approach to the bargaining process,20 meaning that the interests and power 
of labour force and employers should determine the process and outcome of collective 
bargaining. Kahn Freund was however aware of the frailties of his hands off approach, thus 
provided that for this approach to succeed it depended on two factors; namely the economic 
situation and secondly on the organisational strength of the working class.21 
 
Since the establishment of the Industrial Court, its duty has been the development of our labour 
law in numerous areas. A large amount of the Industrial Court’s time has been invested in 
clarifying and developing an efficient framework for collective bargaining process. After years 
of deliberation, the court finally accepted that it could impose a duty on the parties to bargain 
                                                          
18 Davies and Freeland Labour and the Law (1983) 18.  
19 Du Toit “What is the future of collective bargaining (and labour law) in South Africa” 2007 ILJ14051407. 
20 Bogg “Representation of Employees in Collective Bargaining within the Firm: Voluntarism in the UK(Report 
to the XVlIth International Congress of Comparative LawJuly2006)” 2006 Electronic Journal of Comparative 
.Law 2. 
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collectively.22 Section 23(5) of the Constitution provides that every trade union, employer’s 
organisation and employer have the right to engage in collective bargaining. National 
legislation may be enacted to regulate collective bargaining. To the extent that the legislation 
may limit a right in this chapter, the limitation must comply with section 36(1) of the 
Constitution.23 
 
The main purpose for collective bargaining is to conclude collective agreements. A collective 
agreement is a written agreement concerning terms and conditions of employment or it may 
relate to any other matter that is of mutual interest concluded by one or more registered trade 
unions and one or more employers’ organisations, or both. Collective agreements can be 
concluded at various levels such as bargaining councils for an entire industry or section of the 
public service, statutory councils for an industry or part thereof, or in workplaces.24 Collective 
agreements enjoy priority over other agreements and certain labour laws. They bind all the 
parties thereto, and their members. They regulate substantive employment conditions to 
establish uniformity and promote labour peace.  
Collective bargaining is importance for employers for it is a tool for maintaining industrial 
peace, on the other hand, workers can use it as a primary tool of maintain certain standards of 
distribution of work, rewards and stability in employment. Furthermore, the power gained 
during bargaining can allow trade unions to also engage with broader issues and apply political 
pressure.25 For a workplace to be effectively governed it requires a process where employers 
and workers can collectively bring forth their primary and competing interests and be able to 
turn these into mutually acceptable rules.26 
In the case of Kem-Lin Fashions CC v Brunton and Another27 it was held that collective 
bargaining promotes self-regulation. Furthermore, that parties know what is best for them, and 
if they agree on certain terms and conditions regarding certain issues, their agreement should 
prevail. 
                                                          
22 Grant “In defence of majoritarianism: part 1 – majoritarianism and collective bargaining” 1993 ILJ 305. 
23 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
24  Baqwa et al The law of Commerce in South Africa (2015) 332. 
25 The traditional alliance between the British Trades Union Congress and the Labour Party, and that of the 
Congress of SA Trade Unions (COSATU) with the SA Communist Party and African National Congress, offer 
two examples of this process.Du Toit “What is the Future of Collective Bargaining (And Labour Law) in South 
Africa” 2007 ILJ 1405. 
26 Du Toit “What is the Future of Collective Bargaining (And Labour Law) in South Africa” 2007 ILJ 1408-9. 
27 2000 25 SA (LAC) 18.  
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CHAPTER 4: MAJORITARIANISM  
 
4.1 Background. 
 
In 1995, the drafters of the LRA made a policy choice to move away from the previous duty to 
bargain in favour of a system of voluntary collective bargaining, especially at sectoral level - 
this was underpinned by the principle of majoritarianism. The LRA creates certain 
organisational rights for majority and representative trade unions such as access rights, debit 
order rights, rights to representatives, and access to information and leave for trade union 
activities. Such rights directly or indirectly induce majoritarianism. 
 
In Kem-Lin Fashions CC v Brunton & another, Zondo JP stated that the LRA endorses the 
principle of majoritarianism.28 He points to section 14(1) and 16(1), which provide for 
organisational rights of electing shop stewards and the disclosure of information to trade 
unions, which represent a majority of the workforce in an entity. Section 18(1) stipulates that 
a trade union representing a majority of the workforce may conclude an agreement with the 
employer where thresholds of representativeness are set for any trade union in that workplace 
to obtain the organisational rights in section 12, 13, and 15 of the LRA. He also points out that 
section 25 and 26 make provision for the conclusion of an agency shop agreement or a closed 
shop agreement, respectively, where a trade union is representative of the majority of the 
workers. Furthermore, in terms of section 78(b) a trade union representing a majority of the 
workforce may establish a company workplace forum. 
 
Although legislation is for majoritarianism, challenges still exists when it comes to the issue of 
deciding who the legitimate parties to a bargaining process are. There are various instances 
where the court has failed to provide a precise, unambiguous and substantiated jurisprudence 
on this issue. The majoritarianism principle has widely been accepted by South African courts29 
and receives judicial support although there are cases where the courts have rejected the 
principle of majoritarianism30.  
                                                          
28 2001 22 ILJ 109 LAC 19.  
29 Du Toit “What is the future of collective bargaining (and labour law) in South Africa” 2007 ILJ 1405. 
30 Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union v South African Correctional Services Workers’ Union 2018 24 SA 
(CC). 
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4.2 Challenges of majoritarianism. 
 
Rejection or criticism of majoritarianism by the industrial courts has occurred quite a number 
of times. This criticism has been founded or justified on a number of grounds, the following 
grounds have frequently been noted: firstly, it is argued that individuals have a right to bargain 
with the employer as individuals;31 secondly that the principle of majoritarianism is disruptive 
of ordinary collective bargaining relations, and will encourage union rivalry; and thirdly, that 
the general duty to bargain should not be subject to the qualification that it is applicable to the 
majority of employees furthermore extension of collective agreements contributes to the loss 
of jobs, and lastly that the principle of majoritarianism has the effect of creating an infringement 
on freedom of associations.32 Furthermore, employers involved in small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) have argued that if bargaining council agreements (affordable for big 
employers) are extended to small and medium enterprises, this has the effect of increasing 
wages, which they cannot afford. This ultimately pressures them out of business or leads to the 
need to have to retrench employees.33 
 
However, the views differ for those who are in favour of the principle of majoritarianism. In   
Kem-Lin Fashion the court also held that the LRA policy choice that the will of the majority 
should prevail over that of the minority, is to avoid proliferation of trade unions in one 
workplace.34 The LRA and the International Labour Organisation promote such arrangement.35 
There is also the argument that negotiations with a minority union often serve no useful purpose 
as the employer usually makes the same agreements with majority unions, thus making 
bargaining with the minority union a needless process. The purpose of a negotiation is to reach 
an agreement regarding a specific issue. It is further argued that an employer would be 
bargaining in bad faith if he/she does so only to appease the minority union knowing very well 
that that same agreement will also be reached once in negotiation again with a majority trade 
                                                          
31 Grant “In defence of majoritarianism: part 2 – majoritarianism and freedom of association” 1993 ILJ1145 - 
1146. 
32 Stocks & Stocks Natal (Pty) Ltd v Black Allied Workers Union & others 1990 11 ILJ 369 (IC) 375H. 
33 Calitz “The extension of bargaining council agreements to none-parties” 2015 SA Merc LJ 12. 
34 n 28 above. 
35 Du Toit “What is the future of collective bargaining (and labour law) in South Africa” 2007 ILJ1405. 
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union.36 This study opposes the above views and will be substantiated further below at 
paragraph 5.3 onwards. 
 
CHAPTER 5: EXTENSION OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
 
5.1 Regulatory framework for the Extension of collective agreements. 
Typically, management holds the social power and labour is inherently subordinate to 
management. There is a power imbalance, which is resolved by labour acting collectively. The 
labour force can use the threat of strike action (economic disruption) as a means to conclude a 
collective agreement.37 Management on the other hand will have to bargain to ensure 
production and distribution is not interrupted, whilst the labour force bargains for conditions 
of service and reward. There are examples of when labour law tries to achieve industrial peace. 
Such as provision in the LRA which allows collective agreements, concluded outside a 
bargaining council between the employer and majority union at the workplace or at enterprise 
level, to be extended to bind employees who are not part of any trade union and any minority 
unions that are not party to such an agreement. These are known as section 23 extensions. 
In order for a collective bargaining agreement to be extended three requirement must be 
fulfilled. Section 23 (1) (d)38 provides that a collective agreement binds employees who are not 
members of the registered trade union or trade unions party to the agreement if – 
“(i) the employees are identified in the agreement; 
(ii) the agreement expressly bind the employees; and 
(iii) that trade union or those trade unions have as their members the majority of employees 
employed by the employer in the workplace.” 
 
The effects of this section are that it determines that a collective agreement between parties 
may be extended to cover all employees in a “workplace”. Thus the collective agreement will 
be applicable on all employees, even where they belong to another union or no union at all.39 
                                                          
36 Du Toit “What is the future of collective bargaining (and labour law) in South Africa” 2007 ILJ1405. 
37 Fergus & Godfrey “Organising and bargaining across sectors in South Africa: Recent developments and 
potential problems” 2016 ILJ 2216. 
38 The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
39 Kruger & Tshoose “The impact of the Labour Relations Act on Minority Trade Union: A South African 
Perspective” 2013 PELJ 287. 
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Section 3240 states that: 
“(1) A bargaining council may ask the Minister in writing to extend a collective agreement 
concluded in the bargaining council to any non-parties to the collective agreement that are 
within its registered scope and are identified in the request, if at a meeting of the bargaining 
council - 
 ‘(a) one or more registered trade unions whose members constitute the majority of 
 the members of the trade unions that are party to the bargaining council vote in 
 favour of the extension; and 
 (b) one or more registered employers’ organisations, whose members employ the 
 majority of the employees employed by the members of the employers’ 
 organisations that are party to the bargaining council, vote in favour of the 
 extension.” 
 
Section 32(2) permits the Minister to extend an agreement even where the employer and unions 
party to the bargaining council do not hold a sectoral majority, provided they are “sufficiently 
representative” within the registered scope of the bargaining council.41 
 
From the above one may ask themselves why does the LRA make provision for the extension 
of collective agreements to parties who are not or do not want to be included or involved in the 
agreement? The answer to this question is that the legislature’s policy choice leans towards the 
advancement of majoritarianism. 
 
There are certain factors listed in section 32(3) of which if the Minister is not satisfied that they 
are present will not grant an extension, such as an exemptions procedure and requirement that 
the collective agreement may not discriminate against non-parties. Where there is majority 
representation within a specific industry by the parties to the bargaining council, the Minister 
has no discretion and thus must extend the agreement as requested. 
It is clear for all to see the advancement of the principles of majoritarianism based on the ease 
with which majority trade unions and majority employers’ organisations can have their 
collective agreements extended by the minister under section 32(3). Furthermore, there are no 
                                                          
40 The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
41 Kruger & Tshoose “The impact of the Labour Relations Act on Minority Trade Union: A South African 
Perspective” 2013 PELJ288. 
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guarantees as to whether there is a true investigation into the interests of minority trade unions 
and whether extensions discriminate upon them or not.42 
The focus of this dissertation will be on section 32(5) of the LRA, reason being that it is 
important to analyse if this section justifies the limitation it imposes on other constitutional 
rights of non-parties. Section 32(5)43 states that despite sub-section (3)(b) and (c), the Minister 
may extend a collective agreement in terms of subsection (2) if – 
 
“(a) the parties to the bargaining council are sufficiently representative within the 
registered scope of the bargaining council 
(b) the Minister is satisfied that failure to extend the agreement may undermine collective 
bargaining at sectoral level or in the public service as a whole. 
(c) the Minister has published a notice in the Government Gazette stating that an 
application for an extension in terms of this subsection has been received, stating where a 
copy may be inspected or obtained, and inviting comment within a period of not less than 
21 days from the date of the publication of the notice; and 
(d) the Minister has considered all comments received during the period referred to in 
paragraph (c);” 
 
Section 32(5) (A)44 states that when determining whether the parties to the bargaining council 
are sufficiently representative for the purposes of subsection (5) (a).The Minister may take into 
account the composition of the workforce in the sector, including the extent to which there are 
employees assigned to work by temporary employment services, employees employed on fixed 
term contracts, part-time employees or employees in other categories of non-standard 
employment. 
It is somewhat surprising that the Minister is required to extend a collective bargaining 
agreement if all the above requirements are met however, the Minister does not have a 
discretion not to extend a collective bargaining agreement.45 The effects of this situation are 
that it leaves a perception that the parties in a bargaining council who have concluded an 
agreement have the power to enforce any terms or conditions that they deem acceptable on 
those parties within the council who do not want to be or are not involved in the agreement. 
                                                          
42 Du Toit “The extension of bargaining council agreements: Do the amendments address the Constitutional 
challenge” 2014 ILJ2644. 
43 The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
44 The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
45 Calitz “The extension of bargaining council agreements to none-parties” 2015 SA Merc LJ 3. 
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Reasons for non-involvement may be that the terms and conditions agreed upon were 
unacceptable, however the perception has already been created.  
 
It is also interesting to note that when one looks at the old LRA, the Minister did have a 
discretion to extend agreements. The old act provided that when an industrial council transmits 
to the Minister any collective agreement, the Minister may, if he deems it expedient to do so, 
extend the agreement to non-parties. Before publishing the extension in the Government 
Gazette, a provisional notice setting forth the purport of the extension had to be published and 
interested persons could lodge objections in terms of section 48.46 Whenever the Minister 
considered that it would be in the interests of persons, employers, employees, or in the public 
or national interest, that all or any of the provisions of any agreement, notice, award or order 
should not be applicable in a certain area or to certain classes of persons within an area or part 
of an area. The Minister could exclude such areas or classes of persons from the order after 
consulting with the industrial council, and if there was no council, with employers and even 
employees who would be affected by the order (extension).47 The above approach seems to be 
more fair and considerate and leaves me with a question as to why it was not included to the 
current LRA. 
 
It is surprising that the LRA of 1956 (old act) when dealing with the extension of collective 
agreements, is seemingly more in line with the requirements of just and administrative action 
as oppose to the current Act.48 In the current LRA the Minister does not have to consult any 
person or body for mandatory or any discretionary collective agreement extensions. 
Furthermore there seems to be no indication that the minister has the discretion to exclude 
certain classes of persons from the extended agreement, this appears to be a digression by the 
legislature from the initial requirements set forth in the LRA of 1956, which seems to be an 
uninformed move. 
 
5.2 Purpose of extension. 
 
However, the extension of collective agreements is not all doom and gloom. Without an 
extension, collective agreements will only bind the parties to the agreement. This is because 
                                                          
46 The Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956. 
47 S 51 (12) of the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956. 
48 Calitz “The extension of bargaining council agreements to none-parties” 2015 SA Merc LJ 3-4. 
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trade unions bargain for better wages and conditions of employment for their members and the 
non-unionised employees will not enjoy the benefits of these negotiations unless the employer 
voluntarily agrees to apply the same terms to all employees.49 Seeing that there is no obligation 
to belong to a trade union, trade unions thus aim to prevent undercutting by non-unionised 
employees who may agree to working for lower wages. 
From an employer’s perspective, it is beneficial for the organised employers to prevent other 
employers in the same sector but who are not parties to the collective agreement, from 
competing with them by paying their employees lower wages. From an organised employees 
perspective it is also beneficial if they have agreed to improved conditions of employment in 
their workplace, thus the conditions of employment are improved across the particular sector. 
Another benefit of extensions is to maintain industrial peace throughout a sector for a period. 
 
Although the extension of bargaining council agreements may have been effective in the past, 
currently there are questions concerning extensions to non-parties. A number of issues have 
been raised, the first being that a number of extensions were invalid and unlawful50, secondly 
that the provisions of the LRA which deal with extensions of collective agreements are 
unconstitutional, and thirdly that the extension of these collective agreements has a detrimental 
effect on the economy.51 These three issues, along with various others, will be dealt with in 
more depth immediately below. 
 
5.3 Questions regarding the lawfulness of extensions. 
 
In dealing with the first issue mentioned above, one sees that there are a number of cases which 
have come before the courts questioning the validity of extension of collective agreements, one 
being that of Valuline CC and Others v The Minister of Labour and Others.52 In this case, there 
were a number of smaller employers involved in the textile sector in KwaZuluNatal. These 
smaller employers referred a decision of the Minister to extend an agreement on wages agreed 
upon in the Clothing and Textile Bargaining Council to the High Court on the ground of 
illegality and also argued that section 32(2) of the LRA was unconstitutional. 
                                                          
49 Kruger & Tshoose “The impact of the Labour Relations Act on Minority Trade Union: A South African 
Perspective” 2013 PELJ 287. 
50 Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union v Chamber of Mines of South Africa 2017 3 SA (CC) 44. 
51 Calitz “The extension of bargaining council agreements to none-parties” 2015 SA Merc LJ 1. 
52 2013 34 ILJ 1404 KZP. 
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The collective agreement was extended in terms of section 32(2) and the Minister relied on a 
certificate issued by the Registrar in terms of section 49. In this case, the court found that the 
extension was invalid, due to the fact that it did not amount to a proper application of the 
Minister's mind to the requirements for extension.53 The court however did not suspend the 
invalidity, and based this decision on the ground that there was no evidence before the court 
that this would lead to disruption.54  
 
However since the amendments to section 32 have been adopted, the effect of the above 
judgment will be cancelled, as the requirements for the extension would be deemed to have 
been satisfied by the issuance of a section 49 certificate by the Registrar. However, the 
representative requirements for extensions in section 32(3) have not been amended and it is 
uncertain what the interplay between this section and the amended section 49 will be, since 
section 49 deals with a different kind of representation than that required by section 32(3).55 
 
5.4 Questions of the constitutionality of extensions. 
 
In dealing with the second issue, one sees that the challenge is that the LRA does not address   
minority unions’ complaints, and that private actors are determining their fate in collective 
bargaining outcomes without their consent. In the case of Confederation of Associations in the 
Private Employment Sector and Others v Motor Industry Bargaining Council56 a collective 
agreement had been extended to employers and groups of employees within the motor industry. 
The employers argued that the extension resulted in an infringement of their constitutional 
rights and that section 32 of the LRA was unconstitutional for it provided the bargaining 
council (which was seen as private actors) with unrestrained power. The court found that 
bargaining councils are not private actors rather they are organs of state which exercise powers 
and perform public functions in accordance with the LRA57 
An aspect that was not been considered by the court is that the members of the bargaining 
council requesting an extension are private parties that may have an interest in extending 
                                                          
53 2013 34 ILJ 1404 KZP 67. 
54 2013 34 ILJ 1404 KZP 82. 
55 Calitz “The extension of bargaining council agreements to none-parties” 2015 SA Merc LJ 6. 
56 GPD 464761/2011 (27 November 2013). 
57 GPD 464761/2011 63. 
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agreements to non-parties in order to eliminate competition.58 This can have negative effects, 
thus these parties cannot be regarded as merely exercising a public duty as stated by the court.  
 
5.5 Economic effects of the extension of collective bargaining agreements. 
 
The third of the issues raised in paragraph 4.2 above was that extension of collective 
agreements has received a lot of criticism and has been blamed for the loss of jobs, 
unemployment, and its negative impact on small businesses. This is because there are non-
party employers who are able to increase wages negotiated in the bargaining council, but on 
the other hand, there are non-party employers, who do their best to comply with the extended 
collective agreement, and may need to decrease the number of workers that they employ in 
order to increase the wages of the remaining workers.59 
Brassey states that “workers are no longer the least advantaged class... now it is the jobless 
who make up this class” and the unemployed are willing to offer their services at a lower 
price.60 Calitz considers the impact that wage negotiations in bargaining councils have on 
wages, and she concludes that wages are “raised considerably” in sectors where there is a 
bargaining council and such sectors also have lower levels of employment by small 
businesses.61 Employers involved in SMEs argue that if bargaining council agreements 
(affordable for big employers) are extended to them, this will raise wages, which they cannot 
afford and that will in turn force them out of business or they will have to retrench some 
employees. 
 
5.6 Divergent Interests. 
 
Other issues to consider are that not all employers and employees within an industry have the 
same interests. For example, large employers’ interests may differ from small employers’ 
interest, or employers in a particular sub-sector may have different interests to employers in 
another sub-sector.62 The same can be said for parties to a bargaining council which represent 
and bargain for the unique needs of their members.63 Thus when there is collective bargaining 
                                                          
58 Calitz “The extension of bargaining council agreements to none-parties” 2015 SA Merc LJ 7-8. 
59 Godfrey et al “Regulating the labour market: The role of bargaining councils” 2006 ILJ 731. 
60 Brassey “Fixing the laws that govern the labour market” 2012 ILJ 7. 
61 Calitz “The extension of bargaining council agreements to none-parties” 2015 SA Merc LJ 16. 
62 Calitz “The extension of bargaining council agreements to none-parties” 2015 SA Merc LJ 18-19. 
63 Calitz “The extension of bargaining council agreements to none-parties” 2015 SA Merc LJ 19. 
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at a central or sectoral level, agreements should be broader or wider in the sense that it creates 
more of a framework as opposed to specifying in great detail actual terms and conditions and 
actual wages, leaving no room for employers to negotiate terms which are enterprise specific.64 
This should be the same in situations where the intention of the parties is to extend the 
collective agreement concluded in the bargaining council to non-parties. 
 
5.7 Imposing the will of others. 
 
One of the problems regarding the extension of collective agreements is the fact that the process 
binds non-parties to conditions that they have not had a role in negotiating.65 Centralised 
bargaining has a bigger impact on the labour market, however enterprise bargaining only has a 
limited effect on the labour market. The reason for this is that the bargaining unit is smaller 
and negotiations are specific to that enterprise, and the ability to pay of the firm. This means, 
however, that non-parties to a bargaining council have not been involved in the negotiations 
and thus their ability to pay has not been considered. 
 
 
CHAPTER 6: INFRINGEMENTS CASUED BY MAJORITARIANISM 
 
6.1 Right to administrative action. 
 
Section 33 of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to administrative action that 
is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.66 The right to administrative action is also given 
effect to by the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act67 (PAJA). To determine whether the 
extension of bargaining council agreements by the Minister can be regarded as administrative 
action, one has to consider section 1 of PAJA, which defines administrative action as any 
decision taken, or any failure to take a decision, by —  
“(a) an organ of state, when (i) exercising a power in terms of the Constitution or a 
provincial constitution; or (ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function 
                                                          
64 Brassey “Fixing the laws that govern the labour market” 2012 ILJ 8. 
65 Godfrey et al “Regulating the labour market; the role of bargaining councils” 2006 ILJ 732. 
66 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
67 3 of 2000. 
21 
 
in terms of any legislation; . . . which adversely affects the rights of any person and which 
has a direct, external legal effect . . .”68 
The action of the Minister in extending a collective agreement can be seen as administrative 
action, since he or she can be regarded as an organ of state in terms of section 239 of the 
Constitution, which defines an organ of state as a functionary 'exercising a public power or 
performing a public function in terms of any legislation'. Furthermore, it can be argued that the 
Minister, when extending an agreement, is 'exercising a public power in terms of legislation'. 
The administrative action performed by the Minister does not fall under the exclusions of 
PAJA.69  
The first requirement for just administrative action in the Constitution is lawfulness. A further 
requirement for reasonableness is proportionality. Seeing that this study has discussed the issue 
of constitutionality above in paragraph 4.4 and concluded that the extension of collective 
agreements result in an infringement of constitutional rights and that section 32 of the LRA is 
unconstitutional for it provided the bargaining council (private actors) with unrestrained power. 
One can also conclude that this unconstitutionality leads to unjust administrative action by the 
Minister. Furthermore this adversely affects rights such as freedom of expression, equality and 
human dignity of minority trade unions and their members 
 
 “In cases where an administrative action materially and adversely affects the rights of the public, 
an administrator, in order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair administrative action, must 
decide whether-  
(a) To hold a public inquiry in terms of subsection (2); 
(b) To follow a notice and comment procedure in terms of subsection (3); 
(c) To follow the procedures in both subsection (2) and (3); 
(d) Where the administrator is empowered by any empowering provision to follow another 
appropriate procedure which gives effect to section 3.”70 
 
In most instances where collective bargaining agreements are extended it’s not often that the 
minister holds a public inquiry or attempts to find any other appropriate procedures to protect 
the rights of the minority thus the exercise of the administrative function is hardly fair, 
reasonable or proportionate. 
                                                          
68 The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
69 See section 1 (aa) – (ii) of The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
70 Section 4(1) of The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
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6.2 Democracy. 
 
There are questions as to whether the principle of majoritarianism reflects the constitutional 
value of democracy enshrined in our Constitution. In the case of Democratic Alliance & 
Another v Masondo,71 Sachs J makes insightful remarks regarding the application of 
democracy. Although the context of the case was democracy at local government, Sachs states 
that fair representation does not require a mathematical form of democracy but rather 
contemplates a pluralistic democracy where there is respect for the rights of all to be heard and 
to have their views considered.72 
A pluralistic democracy as referred to by Sachs J, is one that allows minorities the power to 
determine issues specific to those minorities and the majority is prevented from deciding 
matters of particular importance to the minority.73 Thus in not following this approach when 
applying democracy it is evident that minority trade unions are suppressed by the majority 
furthermore their rights are not protected which begs the question as to whether minority trade 
unions can ever flourish enough to developed into bigger and stronger unions that will provide 
sufficient representation to its members and furthermore promote collective bargaining. 
Although private persons and institutions are not required by the Constitution to act in a 
democratic manner, the preamble does suggest an expectation that democracy will permeate 
all social relations and inform all South Africans when dealing with one another.74 If the above 
argument does not suffice then the principle of democracy should in all events be applicable to 
the extension process because, once a collective agreement is extended to non–parties by the 
Minister as provided by section 32, its binding force is derived from the fact that it is a form of 
delegate legislation.75 
Yes the limitation of rights of the minority to save the majority may not be undemocratic, but 
where rights are infringed through majoritarianism then the limitation clause must be used to 
determine if such limitation is justifiable. The will of the majority on its own will not be 
sufficient to justify the limitation of a right.76 
 
                                                          
71 2003 (2) SA 413 (CC). 
72 n 50 above par 42. 
73 Malan “Observations on representatively, democracy and homogenization”2010 TSAR 436. 
74 Roux Democracy Constitutional Law (2014) 10-23. 
75 Fredericks & others v MEC for Education and Training Eastern Cape and Others 2002 2 BLLR 119 (CC) 28. 
76 Roux Democracy Constitutional Law (2014) 10-34. 
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6.3 Labour relations. 
 
Aside from the value of democracy, there are a number of fundamental rights that are affected 
by section 32(5) of the LRA. The first of which is the right provided under section 23 of the 
Constitution, the right to fair labour practices. The most important section here is section 23(5) 
which states that every trade union, employers’ organisation and employer has the right to 
engage in collective bargaining. National legislation may be enacted to regulate collective 
bargaining, and limit the right, provided that the limitation complies with section 36(1) of the 
Constitution.77 Extensions of collective agreements to non-parties are brought about by 
national legislation, and extensions affect the right of non-parties to engage in collective 
bargaining without good cause. 
 
6.4 Right to strike. 
 
Majoritarianism limits the right provided for in section 23(2) (c) of the   Constitution, which is 
the right of workers to strike. Du Toit78 makes reference to a case by the Canadian Supreme 
Court in Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan79, where the constitutionality of 
provincial legislation limiting the right to strike was at issue, and wherein it was held that;  
“the right to strike is not merely derivative of collective bargaining, it is an indispensable 
component of that right.” 
The above decision should be taken into account when dealing with majoritarianism because 
the Constitution states that when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum may 
consider foreign law.80 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
77 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
78 Du Toit “‘Collective bargaining’ or ‘collective begging’?” 2015 http://www.mylexisnexis.co.za/index.aspx  (-
11-2018). 
79 2015 SCC 4 3. 
80 S 39(1) (c) of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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6.5 Equality. 
 
Section 9 of the Constitution deals with the right to equality, this provision provides that 
everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law; 
that the state may not directly or indirectly discriminate against anyone on one or more of the 
following grounds, race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth,81 
and that no person may discriminate against another on those same prohibited grounds.  
Although the discrimination created by the principle of majoritarianism may not fall under the 
listed grounds of the Constitution the enabling legislation of section 9 being the Promotion of 
Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act82 (PEPUDA) states that when 
establishing if there has been an infringement of the right to equality, it must be established 
that there has been a differentiation and that there is no rational relationship between the 
differentiation in question and the governmental purposes.83 It must also be established whether 
the discrimination impairs or is likely to impair human dignity; the position of the complainant 
in society and whether he/she suffers from patterns of disadvantage or belongs to a group that 
suffers from patterns of disadvantage; whether the discrimination is systematic; the purpose of 
the discrimination; and if there are less restrictive and less disadvantageous means to achieve 
the purpose.84  In the case of majoritarianism it is clear that there is a systematic differentiation 
between the minority and the majority trade unions, and in most cases the minority trade unions 
is the one that is at a disadvantage. The fact that the minority trade unions have little to no say 
in the extension of collective bargaining agreements means that wages can be agreed upon 
which adversely affect the lives of their members and ultimately their human dignity, 
furthermore there are less restrictive means which can be followed thus the differentiation is 
irrational bearing in mind that both the minority and majority unions and their members often 
have competing interests. 
 
 
 
 
6.6 Right to dignity. 
                                                          
81 S 9(3) of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
82 4 of 2000. 
83 Rautenbach & Malherbe Constitutional Law (2009) 365. 
84 S 14 of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000. 
25 
 
 
Section 10 provides that everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity 
respected and protected.85 Dignity is seen as a founding value of the Constitution and the 
foundation of other fundamental rights. The extension of collective agreements to non-parties 
can result in employers being unable to pay employees due to higher wages agreed upon. This 
can also lead to (largescale) retrenchment or little to no desire to employ new recruits, thus 
ultimately limiting the right to dignity of employees and prospective job-seekers. 
 
6.7 Freedom of expression. 
 
Section 1686 provides that everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right is closely 
related to the right to freedom of association along with other rights in the bill of rights, such 
as the right to dignity and the right to assembly.87 This brings forth the argument that to ensure 
that there is a democratic deliberation process, when deciding if a collective agreement should 
be extended to apply to any industry in its entirety, all affected parties to this agreement should 
be able to express their views regarding the extension prior to a final decision being made. 
Majoritarianism does not take account of such, thus limiting the right to freedom of expression. 
 
6.8 Freedom of association. 
 
In most if not all civil life, a basic right underpinning all others is the freedom of association.88 
An employee’s rights are set out in section 5 of the LRA, which reinforces the rights set out in 
section 23 (2) of the Constitution: the right to form and join trade union to participate in its 
lawful activities, to elect representative, office bearer and official or to stand for election to 
such position, and if elected to discharge the functions attached to them. The right to join a 
trade union is expressly extended to persons seeking employment, the importance of joining a 
trade union is further highlighted by the prohibition on requiring employees or applicants for 
employment not to be members of a trade union.89 
                                                          
85 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
86 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996.  
87 Case and Another v Minister of Safety and Security and Others, Curtis v Minister of Safety and Security and 
Others 1996 7 SA (CC) 27. 
88 Grogan Collective Labour Law (2014) 22. 
89 Grogan Collective Labour Law (2014) 24. 
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It is vital to analyse the effects of majoritarianism on constitutional rights such as the right to 
freedom of association in examining its constitutionality. A trade union is an association of 
employees with the purpose of regulating relations between the employees and the employers 
or employers’ organisation. The LRA provides for freedom of association in section 4 and 
states that (1) Every employee has the right – (a) to participate in forming a trade union or 
federation of trade unions; and (b) to join a trade union has the right, subject to its constitution.90 
 
Freedom of association has become a cornerstone for collective bargaining. Freedom of 
association deals with a group of people joining together for some purpose. It is also necessary 
for the fulfilment of a number of different rights, including the right to organise, to engage in 
collective bargaining and to strike.91 Collective agreements which are extended to parties who 
are not members of a majority trade union, or an employers’ organisation have the effect of 
infringing on these non-parties right to freedom of association. This is because agreements that 
are extended to them, which they did not participate in the negotiation of, end up binding them 
without them having chosen to do so. Furthermore minority unions that have collective 
agreements extended upon them end up looking as if they have betrayed their members by 
binding themselves and their members to agreements which they did not have much of a voice 
in. 
 
In dealing with the constitutionality of section 32(5) of the LRA, one must be aware of the fact 
that the rights contained in the Bill of Rights are not absolute and may, under certain 
circumstances, be justifiably limited by a law of general application.92 Thus the court has a 
duty to determine if a limitation of a right in the Bill of Rights is justifiable. According to 
section 3693 the court is required to enquire into whether the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. 
The above requirement calls for considerations of proportionality,94 furthermore the limitation 
of a right must be rational, meaning that the limitation must serve a compellingly important 
purpose.95 
 
                                                          
90 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
91 Van Niekerk et al (2015) 366. 
92 Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2013) 171. 
93 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
94 Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2013) 162-163. 
95 Devenish The South African Constitution (2015) 181. 
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It is clear that majoritarianism and the extension of collective agreements limits more rights 
than it actually protects, furthermore it is not clear that the limitations it poses on a number of 
rights, which have been discussed above, serve a compellingly important purpose. 
 
 
CHAPTER 7: CLOSED SHOP AND AGENCY  
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Unless there is a compellingly important purpose, there should be no limitation to a right in the 
Bill of Rights, however, there are limitations on employees’ freedom of associating which the 
LRA makes room for, through closed shop and agency shops agreements. Most of these 
agreements are aimed at making sure that employees who do not belong to any trade union do 
not enjoy the protection and benefits of collective bargaining at no costs to them. Closed shop 
force “free riders”, which are those people who do not belong to any union, to join the majority 
union whilst on the other hand agency shop merely require them to make a financial 
contribution.96 
 
7.2 Closed shop 
 
A closed shop agreement is an agreement which states that all employees who are party to that 
agreement or to whom it is extended are required to be members of the union party, thus only 
members of that union may be employed by the employer that is party to the agreement.97 
Closed shop agreements were developed in the 19th century and were found to be in line with 
common law and not contrary to public policy neither.98 Closed shop agreements were also 
promoted by the industrial court when the 1956 LRA was still in effect. The current LRA still 
allows for close shop agreements which are regulated under section 26. However, taking 
cognisance of the numerous opportunities of exploitation/abuse that closed shops present, to 
ensure that there is compliance with the Constitution closed shop agreements have various 
limitations placed on them. 
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One of these limitations is that a closed shop agreement may be concluded only by majority 
registered trade unions, acting alone or with others. Further limitations are provided in section 
26 (3) which states that a closed shop agreement is binding only if –  
“(a) a ballot has been held of the employees to be covered by the agreement; 
(b) two thirds of the employees who voted have voted in favour of the agreement; 
(c) there is no provision in the agreement requiring membership of the representative trade 
union before employment commences; and 
(d) it provides that no membership subscription or levy deducted may be paid to a political 
party as an affiliation fee; contributed in cash or kind to a political party or a person standing 
for election to any political office; or used for any expenditure that does not advance or 
protect the socio- economic interests of employees.”99 
The second limitation is that no closed shop agreement may last longer than 3 years from the 
first ballot, unless it is renewed by a similar majority, thus a closed shop agreement terminates 
as soon as a majority votes for it.100 From the above it is clear that none unionised employees 
are excluded from closed shop agreements, there is also exclusion of employees who are not 
members of majority trade unions. Furthermore closed shop agreements may oblige all 
employees to be members of the majority trade union.Thus one sees the principle of 
majoritarianism once again limiting the rights of none unionised and minority trade union 
employees to engage in closed shop agreements which could have been to their benefit. 
 
7.3 Agency shop 
 
Agency shops are similar to closed shops in that they are aimed at employees who benefit from 
efforts of a union in collective bargaining without paying for these benefits, these employees 
are also known as “free riders”. However, the reach of an agency shop agreement is limited in 
that the affected employees are not bound to join the signatory union, they are simply required 
to pay an agreed fee to finance the activities of recognised unions.101 Furthermore agency shop 
agreements are similar to closed shop agreements in that they are regulated by the LRA and 
are concluded only between an employer or employers’ organisation and a majority union or 
coalition of unions in a workplace or a sector. The effects however of an agency shop 
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agreement are that it requires an employer to deduct an agreed fee from the wages of employees 
identified in the agreement who are not members of the trade union but are eligible for 
membership.102 
Similar to a closed shop agreement agency shops agreement are excluding of minority trade 
union, also they do not give minority trade unions a chance to negotiate with regards to the 
agreed fee to be deducted from the wages of employees. Furthermore agency shop agreements 
decided upon by majority trade unions result in wage deductions of none unionised employees, 
instead of just excluding these employees from the agency shop agreements or any protection 
that may come from it. 
 
 
CHAPTER 8: RECENT CASE LAW DEALING WITH MAJORITARIANISM 
 
8.1 Introduction  
 
Before this study reaches the summit of the constitutional enquiry into the state of 
majoritarianism, it is imperative to look at how Constitutional Courts have been recently 
dealing with the principle of majoritarianism in South Africa. This study will discussing two 
recent cases being the case of Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union v Chamber 
of Mines of South Africa (AMCU case) and the case of Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union 
v South African Correctional Services Workers’ Union (POPCRU case). 
 
8.2 AMCU case 
 
In the case of Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union v Chamber of Mines of 
South Africa103 two issues where dealt with firstly whether workers at five gold mines may 
exercise the right to strike while an agreement prohibiting strikes, to which they were not party 
to, is in force; and second issue being whether an agreement concluded between mining 
companies and their collective representative on one hand, and unions representing a majority 
of workers of those companies on the other, binds employees at individual mines where their 
own union, which is not party to the agreement, is the majority union?  
                                                          
102 n 76 above. 
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In his judgment in paragraph 23 Cameron J states that constitutional rights are at issue, 
AMCU’s contentions of sections 23 and 32 of the LRA are considerable, therefore leave to 
appeal must be granted. He states further in paragraphs 25-27 that the focus of the definition 
of “workers” is on workers as a collective rather than as separate individuals; in terms of the 
definition of “workplace” location is not primary, functional organization is; and finally, that 
regardless of places, one or more, where employees of an employer work, they are part of the 
same workplace. At paragraph 33 he states that AMCU cannot plausibly argue that the statutory 
definition (workplace) shouldn’t apply to section 23 because of constitutional principle or 
purpose-related statutory considerations, those in truth negative its argument. 
In paragraphs 39 and 40 he states that adopting a broad interpretation effectively involves 
jettisoning the statutory definition and adopting a new, independently created meaning of 
“workplace”, one that flows from the facts of this case, but there is no sound reason to depart 
from the statutory definition and that it follows that the agreement was validly extended to 
AMCU at the five AMCU-majority mines.  
In his conclusion, he pens at paragraph 43 that “it is majoritarianism that underlies the statute’s 
countenancing of both agency shop agreements (deductions for majority union fees from all 
employees, both members and non-members) and closed shop agreements (collective 
agreement may oblige all employees to be members of the majority trade union). Furthermore, 
at paragraph 56 he goes on to state that majoritarianism is functional to enhanced collective 
bargaining and is internationally recognised; at paragraph 57 he quotes Khampepe J in the 
TAWUSA case who stated that ‘the principle finds application after collective agreement has 
been concluded.’ It is for the abovementioned reasons that the appeal was dismissed. 
It is clear that the above judgement is in full support of the principle of majoritarianism however 
there have been opposing views formed and this was observed in the case that follows. 
 
 
8.3 POPCRU case  
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The Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union v South African Correctional Services Workers’ 
Union104 case dealt with whether or not minority trade unions have the right to collective 
bargaining in terms of section 18 and section 20 of the LRA.  
In the Minority judgment penned by Cahalia AJ the question of law which was considered was 
whether an employer and a minority trade union that does not meet the threshold of 
representativeness, may enter into a collective agreement with a majority union. Furthermore, 
in paragraph 38 the issue in dispute was whether the 2001 threshold agreement prevented the 
Department of Correctional Services from concluding an organizational rights agreement with 
SACOSWU. 
Cahalia AJ goes on to quote the Bader Bop105 case in which Du Plessis AJA stated that “an 
interpretation permitting a non-representative trade union to acquire organizational rights in 
the face of a threshold agreement would render section 18 nugatory”. Paragraph 42 states that 
“in the absence of a threshold agreement, SACOSWU’s entitlement to acquire organizational 
rights through collective bargaining with the Department of Correctional Services is governed 
by Bader Bop” this means that the fact that SACOSWU is a minority trade union does not 
preclude it from acquiring organizational rights from the Department of Correctional Services. 
In his order Cahalia AJ found that the appeal at hand was moot due to the fact the 2001 
threshold agreement ceased to exist and on that ground found that it would not be in the interest 
of justice that leave to appeal be granted.  
In paragraph 62, in the majority judgment Jafta J agrees that the appeal is moot, but does not 
agree that the appeal should be dismissed solely on that ground. At paragraph 69 he states that 
a minority union that has no significant interest or substantial number of employees may not 
be granted organizational rights by an arbitrator; and at paragraph 70 he goes on to state that 
“the interpretation of section 18 and section 20 would also benefit minority unions which prefer 
to negotiate with the employer rather than acquiring organizational rights from an arbitrator” 
he states further that there is nothing in the LRA which obliges minority unions to follow the 
section 28(8C) route to acquisition of organizational rights.  
In his conclusion Jafta J quotes the Bader Bop case which stated that “the principle of 
majoritarianism which is embraced by our labour law is not incompatible with the principle of 
freedom of association which finds expression in the right to form and join a union of one’s 
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choice.” It is based on this reasoning that he found that it would be unconstitutional to preclude 
a minority union from entering into collective agreements and acquiring organizational rights 
granted by section 12, 13 and section 15 of the LRA. The order is given at paragraph 112, 
which was that the application for leave to appeal was granted and that the appeal was 
dismissed. Zondo DCJ in his concurring judgment concurred with Jafta J and gave the same 
order as well with the reasoning that it would be in the interest of justice to do so. 
The POPCRU case, which is a 2018 judgement, does not do away with majoritarianism, 
however here one sees an approach by the Constitutional court where what is in the interest of 
justice is taken into consideration when dealing with majoritarianism. Through this approach 
the rights of minority trade unions such as, organisational rights, freedom of association are 
taken into account, this study is in support of this approach. 
 
 
CHAPTER 9: INTERNATIONAL LAW CONSIDERATIONS 
 
9.1 Relevant international law 
 
This study does not aim to provide a comparative study however, based on section 39 (1)of the 
Constitution when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum must promote the 
values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom, furthermore must consider international law. Section 233 of the Constitution states 
that when interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of 
the legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that 
is inconsistent with international law. Also section 1(b) of the LRA stipulates that one of the 
purpose of the LRA is to give effect to South Africa’s obligations incurred as a result of it being 
a member state of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). In terms of section 3 of the 
LRA the act must be interpreted to give effect to its primary objects, in compliance with the 
Constitution and the public international law obligations of the Republic.106 Thus it is important 
to take into consideration the international obligations South Africa has, as will be done below. 
                                                          
106 The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
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One of the main functions of the ILO is standard setting.107 The ILO aims to promote workers’ 
rights, dignified human working conditions and social security in general, at the same time, it 
aims to prevent states from gaining advantages in international competition by maintaining a 
low level of workers’ rights. The ILO sets standards through conventions; which are binding 
agreements between states, declarations; which are documents stating agreed upon standards 
but which is not legally binding, and recommendations; which serve as non-binding guidelines. 
 
For purposes of this dissertation this study will discuss two primary core conventions which 
are the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention of 1948, 
herein referred to as Convention 87, along with the Right to Organise and Collective 
Bargaining Convention of 1949 herein referred to as Convention 98 which have both been 
ratified by South Africa. Section 32(5) of the LRA contains a consideration by the Minister as 
to whether the failure to extend a collective bargaining agreement will undermine collective 
bargaining at sectoral level. Thus it is important to analyse what international law prescribes in 
terms of undermining or promoting collective bargaining at sectoral level.  
The Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention of 1948 aims 
to giving effect to the preamble of the constitution of the ILO which states that recognition of 
the principle of freedom of association as a means of improving conditions of labour and of 
establishing peace.108 Article 2 of the above convention provides various protection in order to 
promote freedom of association and the right to organise, which includes the right of employers 
and workers to join organisations of their own choosing, subject only to the rules of that 
organisation. The right of workers and employers organisations to draw up their constitutions 
and rules, elect representatives freely, to organise their administration and activities and 
formulate their programmes,109 and the obligation on members states to take all necessary and 
appropriate measures to ensure that workers and employers are able to exercise freely the right 
to organise.110 
 
The Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention of 1949 is probably the more 
important of the two conventions that will be discussed. It provides the requirements that 
                                                          
107 Van Niekerk et al (2015) 22. 
108 The Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention of 1948. 
109 Article 3 (1) of The Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention of 1948. 
110 Article 11 of The Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention of 1948. 
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machinery appropriate to national conditions should be established to ensure respect for the 
right to organise.111 Article 4 states that; 
 
“Measures appropriate to national conditions should be taken, where necessary, to 
promote and encourage the full development and utilisation of machinery for voluntary 
negotiation between employers and employers’ organisations and workers’ organisations, 
with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of employment by means of collective 
agreements.”112 
 
Article 4 is important for it provides support for legislation which provides a framework for 
voluntary collective bargaining. However there is no duty to bargain in South Africa rather 
there’s a system of voluntarism. Furthermore Article 4 creates an obligation on member States 
to promote and encourage collective bargaining in their countries where appropriate. 
 
Section 23 of the Constitution113 seems to be in accordance with the two above conventions. 
Apart from the express promotion in convention 98 for voluntary collective bargaining these 
conventions do not seem to provide any rights, measures, protections or obligations which are 
not already contained in the Constitution. 
Bearing in mind that conventions are general in nature in order for States to be able to 
implement them, it is relevant to look at recommendations as well, such as the Collective 
Agreements (Recommendation 91) to see if it provides any further guidance. Clause 5(1) of 
the Recommendation provides that where appropriate and taking into account the practice and 
conditions of each country, measures should be taken to extend certain parts of collective 
agreements to all employers and workers in the particular industry or scope of the 
agreements.114 
From the above clause it appears that the ILO is pro extension of collective agreements, 
however this principle is not an inflexible rule, because it is subjected to considerations of what 
is appropriate in the national context.  
Clause 5(2) of the above recommendation provides that the laws or regulations in countries can 
make extensions subject to conditions such as: 
                                                          
111 Article 3 of the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention of 1949. 
112 The Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention of 1949. 
113 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
114 The Collective Agreements Recommendation 1951. 
35 
 
(a) that the collective agreement already covers a number of the employers and workers 
concerned which is, in the opinion of the competent authority, sufficiently representative; 
(b) that, as a general rule, the request for extension of the agreement shall be made by one 
or more organisations of workers or employers who are parties to the agreement; 
that prior to the extension of the agreement, the employers and workers to whom the agreement 
would be made applicable by its extension should be given an opportunity to submit their 
observations.115 
 
Although the provisions under clause 5(2) appear to provide vague preconditions for the 
extension of collective agreements, as it is silent on both criteria to considered by the competent 
authority and what is meant by sufficiently representative. Furthermore it does not provide any 
guidance on when extensions may or may not be appropriate. Leaving us in the same situation 
as seen in both Convention 87 and 98 along with the Constitution which are silent regarding 
which level of collective bargaining is most appropriate. The considerations listed in 
Recommendation 91 are still worth noting. 
 
9.2 ILO Supervisory Bodies 
 
The above provisions do not provide much guidance on their own, thus it may be useful to 
consider the views of ILO supervisory bodies. In NUMSA and Others v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd 
and Another116 the court stated that there are two ILO supervisory bodies tasked with ensuring 
the observation of Convention 87 and Convention 98, which are the Committee of Experts on 
the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (Committee of Experts) and the 
Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA). 
The Committee of Experts examines reports made by member states and make non-binding 
findings which are then submitted to the ILO Conference. The CFA makes recommendations 
to the ILO’s Governing Body regarding whether a case is worth examination.117 In its General 
Survey of 1994, the Committee of Experts observed with regards to Article 4 of Convention 
98, that machinery and procedures should facilitate bargaining between the two sides of 
industry, allowing them the freedom to reach their own settlement.118 The committee stated 
                                                          
115 The Collective Agreements Recommendation 1951. 
116 2003 2 BLLR 103 (CC) 29. 
117 Wisskirchen “The standard-setting and monitoring activity of the ILO: Legal questions and practical 
experience” 2005 ILR 287. 
118 International Labour Organisation General Survey 1994 248. 
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that although public authorities may establish machinery to encourage parties to collective 
bargaining, they must take note of social and economic considerations and public interest. 
Furthermore, that the discretionary power of authorities to approve collective agreements is in 
conflict with the principle of voluntary bargaining. 
The findings of the Committee of Experts may not be binding, however they advise that there 
should be as little interference as possible by authorities in the settlement reached by the 
bargaining partners and the public authorities. Furthermore that were necessary during the 
negotiation process and when requesting an extension to non-parties of a collective agreement, 
the principle of democracy are observed. 
Lastly the ILO standards and the findings of the supervisory bodies, with regards to the 
promotion of collective bargaining, do not provide any findings that a failure to extend a 
collective agreement to non-parties would undermine collective bargaining. 
 
CHAPTER 10: RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Thus this study recommends that section 32(3) (c) and (d) of the LRA should be amended so 
that the representativity of the parties to the agreement and not the parties to the bargaining 
council is taken into account. Section 32(5) (a) and (b) of the LRA should be deleted. The 
provisions in section 32(5) (c) and (d) of the LRA, which provides for an opportunity for non-
parties to submit comments, should be retained, furthermore it must form part of the extension 
of collective agreements process in terms of section 32(2) and 32(3). However, the parties to 
the bargaining council should be required to assess the comments and make a decision as to 
whether amendments to the collective agreement are necessary or not.  
Furthermore the duty to bargain should not be subject to the qualification that it is applicable 
to the majority. It would also be informed for South Africa to learn from its past, by looking at 
the old Labour Act which provided for minister discretion to extend agreements, however the 
minister could decide whether provisions of any agreement, should not be applicable to certain 
areas, classes of people and could exclude such classes of people from an order. Perhaps the 
most import part of the old Act was that the minister also consulted industrial council, if there’s 
no council, then with employers and employees affected, this is something that the current 
legislature ought to consider. This study state that the discretionary power of authorities to 
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approve collective agreements is in conflict with the principle of voluntary bargaining thus, 
should be done away with. 
 
This study recommends that collective bargaining should advance democracy by relying on a 
pluralistic democracy that allows minorities the power to determine issues specific to them, 
and the majority should be prevented from deciding matters of particular importance to the 
minority. Also collective bargaining should be broader or wider in the sense that it creates more 
of a framework as opposed to specifying in great detail actual terms and conditions and actual 
wages, thus leaving no room for employers and employees to negotiate terms which are 
enterprise specific. 
 
This study recommends that South Africa takes into account international law, such as the 
Collective Agreements Recommendation 1951 which subject’s majoritarianism to 
considerations of what is appropriate in the national context. Considerations such as those in 
clause 5(2) (c) which states that prior to the extension of collective agreements the employer 
and workers must submit their observations.  
 
CHAPTER 11: CONCLUSION 
 
This study has examined the state of majoritarianism in South African industrial relations and 
highlighted the inconsistency and/or challenges attributed to majoritarianism. To start off the 
study established that the purpose of labour law is to be a countervailing force to the inequality 
of bargaining power, majoritarianism on the other hand does the opposite as it promotes 
inequality of bargaining power between majority and minority trade unions. 
 
The study discussed how majoritarianism has played a hand in the causing of unemployment, 
divergent interests, imposing the will of others thus not advancing democratisation of the 
workplace. Majoritarianism disrupts ordinary collective bargaining relations and will lead to 
union rivalry. Furthermore majoritarianism has the tendency of infringing on a number of rights 
in the Bill of Rights such as, the right to administrative action, democracy, right to strike, 
equality, right to dignity, freedom of expression and freedom of association. 
The Minister has the discretion of extending collective agreements however after examining 
the unreliability of the “safeguards” of the ministerial discretion in section 32(5) of the LRA it 
seems to be highly limited and capable of manipulation. Section 32(5) of the LRA does infringe 
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the right to fair labour practices, to engage in collective bargaining, to strike and freedom of 
association. Furthermore the limitation to these rights are not justified in terms of section 36 of 
the Constitution, and that there are less restrictive means to extend collective agreements by 
only permitting extensions in terms of section 32 of the LRA, which is in keeping with 
democratic principles.  
 
Extension mechanisms were also examined, bearing in mind that there is no duty to bargain in 
South Africa, one saw that the imposition of the terms of a collective agreement on non-parties 
creates controversy, in particular where non-parties have deliberately not joined the bargaining 
council where the agreement was concluded. 
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